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Forces and causation 
 
 
 Abstract. This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real symmetrical and 
non-causal relations. In the first part, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; in the second 
part, that they are relations; in the third part, that they are symmetrical relations; in the fourth 
part, that they are not causal relations, (but causal relata) by which I mean that they are not 
species of causation. The overall picture is anti-humean to the extent that it defends the 
existence of forces, irreducible to spatio-temporal relations, but is still compatible with 
humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are species of 
causation. 
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I shall defend the view that Newtonian forces are real symmetrical and non-causal relations. In 
the first part, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; in the second part, that they are relations; in the 
third part, that they are symmetrical relations; in the fourth part, that they are not causal relations, by 
which I mean that they are not species of causation.    
 
 
  1.  Forces are real: a truthmaker argument 
 
Are forces real? Following a long tradition1, which has been recently revived by J. 
Wilson (2007), I want to argue that Newtonian forces are real, by which is meant that forces 
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exist independently of our thinking about them and are irreducible to other same-level 
properties (such as mass or acceleration for instance).  Before deciding whether Newtonian 
forces are real or not, we need to make clear why the ontology of Newtonian Mechanics still 
matters today, and to spell out what kind of ontological candidates they are. 
 
1.1. The ontology of Newtonian mechanics  
  
Newtonian Mechanics (NM) may seem to be of little interest for contemporary 
metaphysics since it has been superseded by better physical theories (quantum mechanics, the 
theory of general relativity). Is the ontology of NM of more than historical importance? 
J. Wilson (2007) has argued for a positive answer. According to her, Newtonian mechanics 
should be treated in the same way as the special sciences. The ontologies of thermodynamics, 
biology, psychology, botany or geology are still of some metaphysical importance, despite 
their inapplicability to the quantum world. According to Wilson, the fact that certain 
structurally complex entities or aggregates exhibit enough stability, independent of the details 
of the behaviour of their constituents, constitutes one important rationale for special sciences. 
The same may be true of Newtonian mechanics: though it cannot handle quantum 
indeterminacy, it is still close to the truth concerning the behaviour of the medium-sized 
world. This may be understood in two different ways: first, one may think that 
microphysicalism is false, and that the world is irreducibly layered. If so, Newtonian 
mechanics could be seen as describing and explaining sui generis emergent properties or 
episodes. Second, one may think that microphysicalism is true and that all the entities 
assumed by special sciences are reducible to microphysical ones. Even so, it is still true that 
the ontologies of special sciences matter: they give us candidates for reduction. If we are 
going to carry out a reduction of a special science, or to evaluate whether this reduction has 
been achieved, we need to understand its ontology. Microphysical reductionism is not 
eliminativism: though both agree on the ontology, reductionism holds the reduction of the 
entities posited by the special sciences to be an important task to achieve, contrary to 
eliminativism. I shall only assume that eliminativism about Newtonian mechanics is wrong. I 
will not decide between anti-reductionism and reductionism concerning Newtonian entities. In 
both cases, the ontology of Newtonian mechanics matters for contemporary metaphysics.  
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 1.2. What do forces purport to be? 
 
I shall focus on the question of the ontology of Newtonian forces as they are referred 
to in the three fundamental laws of NM (Newton, 1999): 
 
 First law: “Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly 
 straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces 
 impressed.” 
 Second Law: “A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and 
 takes place along the straight line in which that force is impressed.” 
Third Law: “To any action there is always an opposite and equal reaction; in other 
 words, the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always 
 opposite in direction.”  
 
Before deciding whether forces are real or not it is worth spelling out what kind of 
ontological candidates they are. One suggestion is that the definition of forces is to be found 
in the Second Law2. This sounds odd since prima facie Newton’s formulation does not look 
like a definition. Nevertheless, such a proposal is more easily understood when one considers 
not Newton’s own formulation of the law, but its usual mathematical translation, which states 
that the force exerted on a body equals the product of the mass of the body and the 
acceleration induced in that body:3 
 
 F=ma 
 
(Bold letters represent vectors). Once written this way, one may propose to read the 
“=” as definitional. Since mass and acceleration are admittedly more clearly defined than 
forces4, forces are taken to be the definiendum, and the product of mass by acceleration the 
definiens. The suggestion is then that the alleged second “law” is indeed a nominal definition 
of forces in terms of changes in the motion of bodies. The term “force”, in NM, would just be 
an abbreviation for “accelerating mass”. 
There are I think two reasons to reject such a proposal. First, it cannot be a definition 
of all forces that are appealed to in NM. An important distinction in NM is the one between 
component forces and resultant ones. Force-vectors can be added together, according to 
vector calculus. The addition of two forces F and G having the same direction and the same 
magnitude gives a resultant force H of twice the magnitude and of the same direction as each 
component force.  Component forces are the forces that are added together. Resultant forces 
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are the results of these vectorial compositions.  
Now, the Second Law holds for resultant forces and its exact mathematical 
formulation is rather: 
 
ΣF = ma 
 
The acceleration of a body equals the sum of the forces exerted on that body. Once 
written this way, it becomes clear that the Second Law cannot be a definition of all forces. It 
only states a connection between accelerations and sums of forces, that is, resultant forces. 
Nothing is said about the forces that are summed, that is, component forces. Indeed, there are 
no such nomic connections between each component force that acts on a body and the 
acceleration of the body: very often, as we shall see, there are component forces without any 
actual acceleration of the body under consideration. The component forces exerted on a body 
must then be something else than the acceleration of that body.5 Newton’s Second Law is of 
no direct help in the definition of component forces. C.D. Broad was right to claim that 
Newton’s Second Law is a genuine law (rather than a definition) “asserting a connexion 
between two independently measurable sets of facts in natures” (Broad: 1923: 165).6  
The second reason why the definitional reading of the Second Law should be rejected 
at this stage is that it undermines the very debate between realists and anti-realists about 
forces. The reality of accelerating bodies is clearly not what is at stake in that debate. If forces 
purport to be nothing else than accelerating masses, the realist about forces has simply no 
means to express his view (and the anti-realist about forces has nothing to disagree with). The 
term “force” turns out to be just a notational device in NM, with no new ontological 
commitment. There must be another concept of forces that underlies the substantial 
metaphysical disagreement between realists and anti-realists about forces.  
It is often said that forces are “causes of motion or acceleration” (which is of course 
quite distinct from saying that they are accelerations). Although such a definition is on the 
right track, it has to be specified: not all causes of motion will do (for instance, accelerations 
could be caused by other accelerations). I therefore propose the following preliminary 
definition of force: 
 
  A force is a basic dynamic property that can be represented by a vector. 
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 “Dynamic” is an ambiguous term that is opposed either to “static” or to “kinematic”. 
Here it should be understood in opposition to “kinematic” (statics being crammed with 
dynamic entities, as we shall see).7 Dynamic properties include mass, force, energy, 
momentum, work and so on. Kinematic properties include distance, motion, velocity and 
acceleration. By extension, kinematic properties include distances and shapes and amount to 
spatial properties8. Dynamics is often defined by means of forces: its aim is to explain 
(causally) the motion described by kinematics in terms of properties such as forces, mass, 
energy…9. But since I intend to define forces through the dynamicity, I need a definition of 
dynamics that does not make reference to forces. There are, I submit, two distinctive features 
of dynamic properties. First, though they may have spatial and temporal properties, they are 
not spatial and temporal properties, nor are they reducible to spatial and temporal properties. 
This distinguishes them from kinematical properties, such as shape velocity or acceleration. 
Dynamics explain motion in terms of non-spatial properties But this is not sufficient: 
phenomenal colours for instance are not spatio-temporally reducible, but they are clearly not 
dynamic entities. The second necessary feature of dynamic properties is that they necessarily 
possess causal powers, by which I mean that they can be causes (presumably, of kinematic 
episodes). This distinguishes them from secondary qualities such as colours for which 
epiphenomenalism is at least an option. Dynamic properties are thus spatio-temporally 
irreducible and causally empowered properties. 
To say that forces are represented by vectors means that they are ascribed both a 
magnitude and a direction.10 This distinguishes them from other dynamic entities such as 
mass, work or energy, which are represented by scalars: a magnitude, but no direction is 
ascribed to them.11  
Forces are basic dynamic entities in the sense that they are not constituted by, or 
reducible to other kinds of dynamic entities. This distinguishes them from other dynamic 
entities that may also be described by vectors or combinations of vectors such as momentum, 
moment of forces or inertia tensors. Those entities are defined by reference to vector forces. 
But there is no need to refer to them in order to define vector forces. Forces are then 
irreducible both to kinematical entities and to other dynamical ones. Here again, “irreducible” 
means only irreducible to other medium-sized entities, be they kinematical or dynamical 
(=intra-level irreducibility). Microphysical reduction (inter-level reduction) of forces is not at 
stake here. 
Finally, forces are properties in the generic sense that they are not substances.12 They 
cannot exist by themselves. They are dependent on at least one body. This is compatible with 
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their being basic: forces are basic in the sense in which they are unanalysable or primitive 
entities. But they are non-basic or non-fundamental to the extent that there are existentially 
dependent entities. Whether forces are monadic or n-adic properties is left open at this stage. 
One important upshot is that since forces are dynamic (non spatio-temporally reducible) 
properties, they cannot be relations without violating Humean Supervenience, “the thesis that 
the whole truth about a world like ours supervenes on the spatiotemporal distribution of local 
qualities” (Lewis, 1994: 473). Humean supervenience implies that every external relation is 
spatio-temporal (Lewis, 1986: ix-x). But forces, if they are relations, are external relations that 
are dynamical. 
Putting these remarks together, we can rephrase the definition of forces as follows: 
 
Forces are spatio-temporally irreducible, causally empowered basic properties to 
which are ascribed both a magnitude and a direction. 
 
This definition, I hope, captures a minimal but fairly standard concept of physical 
forces that can be traced back to Newton and that is still adopted in most contemporary 
textbooks and discussions on this matter. The next question is to determine whether there is 
something in reality that correspond to that definition. 
 
 
1.3. The reality of forces 
 
Many objections to the existence of forces have been advanced (unobservability, 
redundancy, overdetermination…). J. Wilson (2007) has I think addressed those objections 
successfully. My goal here will therefore not be to address them again, but rather to look for a 
new positive argument in favour of the reality of Newtonian forces. 
One important, but insufficient rationale for forces lies in the central role that they 
play in NM. This is not sufficient because many upholders of NM, (including maybe Newton 
himself13), have been reluctant to endorse a full-blooded realism about forces. Anti-realist 
about forces have to claim that the term “force”, as it appears in NM, either is not referential 
or refers to something else than sui generis forces. One rather radical way of making sense of 
that claim, which we have just rejected, is to argue that the Second Law is a definition of 
force.  But defining the forces that exerts on a body in terms of the acceleration and mass of 
that body is not the only option for the anti-realist about forces. A more moderate and 
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common option is to claim that the Second Law is indeed a law (not a definition) that 
connects the acceleration of a body not to forces, but to the distribution, masses and motions 
of the other bodies surrounding it14. The term “force” should be understood as referring not to 
forces proper but to all the bodies (possibly unknown) whose kinematical behaviour and mass 
determine the behaviour of the body under consideration. It is then possible to make sense of 
NM without appealing to forces as primitive dynamical entities. The reason to admit forces 
must lie elsewhere. 
There is, I believe, a principled difficulty for those who want to get rid of forces in the 
explanation of the behaviour of medium-sized entities. (Whether this kind of argument can be 
extended to what is not medium-sized is an open question). This difficulty arises from the 
following type of examples: 
Imagine two equally strong persons who are arm-wrestling. By hypothesis, at the time 
they begin their efforts, nothing moves: their respective endeavours neutralize each other. The 
friend of forces cannot help thinking that despite the absence of any motion of their arms, 
something important happened between them. The equilibrium of forces of their arms has 
been radically transformed. Their hands were only juxtaposed at the time each one was about 
to begin its effort. They are now strongly pressing against each other.  
In a similar vein, suppose two magnets are in contact, attracting each other with equal 
force. Suppose also that their attractive powers decrease with time. From a kinematical point 
of view, nothing happens: the magnets do not move relatively to each other, nor relatively to 
anything else. Still, the friend of forces has the strong impression that the two magnets 
undergo some change. At the beginning of the process, the two magnets are attracting each 
other; at the very end, they are only juxtaposed.  
As they stand, those examples will not scare the opponent of forces. He simply does 
not share the inclination to posit dynamical changes. It cannot be assumed that the arms or the 
magnets have undergone a non-spatial change because that is precisely what the 
kinematically-minded people would deny. According to them, the two cases are exactly the 
same at the beginning and at the end: no motion, no change. The only way the friend of force 
can make himself heard by his opponents is by telling them a story about motion. 
So consider the disposition to move of these systems. Before the beginning of their 
contest, the arm of each wrestler is disposed to stand (roughly) in a vertical position if the arm 
of the opponent is removed. After the beginning of the game, the arm of each wrestler is 
disposed to quickly move toward the table if the other arm is suddenly removed. As for the 
magnets, at the beginning of the process, they are disposed to stay in contact when struck by 
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some external body. But they are disposed to move away from each other in the very same 
circumstances at the end of the process. This means that the dispositions to move of these two 
static equilibria have changed. Surely, this is something that the friends of kinematics should 
be willing to explain. It is now true that the arms and the magnets are disposed to move in 
certain ways in certain circumstances. It was not true before. Transposing David Armstrong’s 
truthmaker argument against the Rylean view of disposition15, we can claim that something 
must have changed in the arms and in the magnets that explains the changes of their 
dispositions to move.  If we grant that neither the masses, nor the shapes nor the positions of 
the arms and magnets have changed, some dynamic entity other than the masses must have 
changed. Then some dynamic entities are real. Forces are among the favourite candidates for 
this role. In short: 
 
(i) In some cases, the disposition to move of a system changes without occurrence of 
any kinematic changes inside the system. 
(ii) The proposition that the intrinsic disposition of a system has changed must have a 
truthmaker in the system (Armstrong’s truthmaker argument). 
∴ Some dynamic changes do occur inside certain systems.  
(iii) The best candidates for the changing dynamic properties are forces. 
∴ Some forces are real. 
 
(i) Concerning the first premise, one may protest that some kinematic changes actually 
occurred in the arms and the magnets at a more microphysical level so that after all, the 
alleged macro-dynamic change is reducible to a multiplicity of micro-kinematic changes. But 
recall that the point here is not that forces are not microphysically reducible. It is only that 
they cannot be reduced to other same-level phenomena. The conclusion of the argument is 
only that there are some forces at the macroscopic level. Whether those medium-sized forces 
can be reduced to microphysical kinematic properties, processes or events is an issue that is 
left open. 
Despite this focus on macroscopic phenomena, a possible upshot of this argument for 
microphysical levels is worth being noted. Suppose we can transpose the same argument all 
the way down, that is, suppose that at each level we can encounter changes in dispositions to 
move without changes in same-level kinematical behaviour. Then the argument may show 
that the only way to avoid dynamic entities is to engage in a microphysical regress. The true 
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proposition “The disposition to move of the static system has changed.” must have a 
truthmaker: if not a same-level dynamic change, it should be a level n-1 kinematic change. 
The only way to block such a regress is to admit dynamic entities in our ontology. 
(ii) Concerning the second premise, it is worth pointing out that Armstrong truthmaker 
argument is often sometimes used to kill two birds with one stone: it is first directed against 
the Rylean view of dispositions according to which dispositional talk is metaphysically free-
floating, devoid of any ontological anchorage; and second against dispositionalism, the view 
that there are indeed dispositional properties without categorical basis (a view that Ryle would 
have rejected as well as it opposite, categoricalism). In the second premise, the truthmaker 
argument is only used to the first end: ascriptions of dispositional changes must be 
ontologically grounded. The only point here is the need for a truthmaker, not the nature of the 
truthmaker: it can be a categorical or a dispositional property, a question which I shall address 
later. 
 (iii) The third premise is needed because the two first ones do not show that forces are 
the relevant dynamic entities: they only show that we should look for dynamic —non-
kinematic— changes in each of the two systems. Having said that, it is quite tempting to take 
the plunge and to claim that the entities that have changed are forces. But this requires further 
justification because forces are not the only candidates here: one could also argue that the 
dynamic entities that have changed are the potential energies of the arms and of the magnets. 
Why prefer forces? Though energy-based mechanics has superseded forces-based mechanics, 
both remain equivalent (they are inter-translatable).16 Ontologically, we have still to choose 
between forces and energy. Briefly, one can mention two reasons to prefer forces in the 
explanation of our medium-sized world. (i) Energy-based mechanics holds the principle of 
least action to be primitive, but this principle has often been claimed to have undesirable 
teleological implications17. (ii) Unlike energy, forces can be perceived (felt pressures on our 
skin, see note 51).18 I shall therefore admit that potential energy is not a primitive dynamic 
entity: in order to define it, we need to appeal to the notion of work (roughly, energy is 
defined as the capacity to do work), and in order to define work we need to appeal to forces (a 
work is done on a object when a force causes its displacement, that is, when the point of 
application of a force moves). 
 Finally, an important point about the scope of the above argument is that it shows that 
real forces must be component ones and not (only) resultant ones. Four options are open to 
the realist about forces relative to this distinction: 
(1) Only resultant forces are real, component forces are only theoretical fictions19.  
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(2) Only component forces are real20.  
(3) Both resultant and component forces are real. There are two versions here: 
(3a) The resultant forces and the component forces that constitute them are real 21.  
(3b) Resultant and component forces are never real together: when the component 
forces are real, then the resultant force is fictional; and when the resultant force is 
real, then the component forces are fictional. But both kinds of forces can occur 
alternatively22. 
 
According to Cartwright (1983) only resultant forces are real, component forces being 
theoretical fictions. The present argument, if correct, contradicts this: forces must have 
changed in the system of the two arms, and in the system of the two magnets. Following 
Newton’s Second Law, the resultant force that acts on a body equals the mass of the body 
times its acceleration. Since by hypothesis neither the arms, nor the magnets have undergone 
any acceleration, the resultant force that exerts on them is null, and remains constant during 
the beginning of the efforts of the arms and the decrease of the attractive power of the 
magnets. So exclusive realism about resultant forces cannot account for the change that 
occurred in the systems. If I am right,  (1) is no longer an option for realists about forces: they 
have to choose between the three other options. 
 
2. Forces are relations: the direction problem 
 
I have argued that macroscopic forces are real. The next step is to show that they are 
relations23. Despite the relational character of the expression ‘body a exerts a force on body 
b’, some philosophers  (Bolzano, 1972/1837; Armstrong, 1997; Molnar, 2003) deny that it 
stands for a relation. According to them, forces are monadic properties of physical entities. 
Let us call this a monadistic view about forces.24 Force monadism may be developed in two 
quite different ways. According to the first one, forces are monadic categorical properties. 
According to the second one, forces are monadic dispositional properties.25 I aim to show that 
both options fail. The argument I propose is that none of them can account for the direction of 
force vectors. 
In examining these two monadistic views of force, I shall make two assumptions: 
(i) As far as sparse or natural properties are concerned, the distinction between 
monadic properties and relations is exclusive: ontologically speaking, there are no relational 
monadic properties such as being a brother, or being ten meter from a tree.26 So-called 
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relational properties are not properties. These are just figures of speech, ways of describing 
true relations, abundant properties. As a consequence forces are either properties or relations.  
(ii) Every natural monadic property is intrinsic to the particular that has it (and every 
natural relation is intrinsic to the particulars that have it).27 This implies that the monadic 
natural properties exemplified by a body do not depend on other bodies. Forces, as natural 
properties or relations, must be intrinsic to their bearers. If forces are monadic properties, they 
must be intrinsic to single bodies. If they are relations, they must be intrinsic to the set or sum 
of their relata.28 
 
2.1. Forces are not categorical monadic properties 
 
 According to the first kind of force monadism, advocated by D. M. Armstrong (1997: 
76sqq.)29, forces are categorical monadic properties of force-exerting bodies. This view relies 
on a more general monadism about vectors, including forces but also motions, velocities or 
accelerations. Following Tooley (1988), Robinson (1989) and Bigelow & Pargetter (1989, 
1990a), Armstrong claims that we have to take at face value the attribution of physical vectors 
to bodies at instants.30 Such vectors are not relations between bodies but monadic properties 
of single bodies. Unfortunately the arguments in favour of this view focus on motion and 
velocity vectors rather than on force vectors. If they were to succeed, some additional 
argument would be needed in order to extend this conclusion to forces vectors. I shall grant, 
for the sake of the argument, that such a generalisation from kinematic vectors to force 
vectors is possible.31 I first present vector monadism and then raise an objection to it: vector 
monadism cannot account for an essential feature of vectors, their direction. 
 
The relational view of kinematic vectors (to which I subscribe) states that motion and 
velocity are a matter of spatiotemporal relations between the different positions that a body 
(or parts of a body) occupies at different times. Motion is a change of position. Velocity is the 
rate of this change. Acceleration is the rate of change of this rate of change. This relational 
view is the most standard one. Bigelow and Pargetter (1989, 1990a) attribute it to Ockham 
and its followers. It was adopted by Newton, and was clearly stated by Russell (1992/1903). 
By contrast, the monadist view of kinematic vectors denies that motion and velocity are 
essentially defined or constituted by facts concerning positions at times. According to it, 
velocity and motion are intrinsic or monadic characteristics that a body has at an instant, 
whatever its past or future positions. For the monadist, the notion of “instantaneous velocity” 
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is to be understood literally: it is a velocity that a body has at a time, that is essentially 
independent of the position it has occupied or will occupied at other times, however near they 
are. Two confusions are to be avoided here. 
First, it is important not to confuse this strong notion of instantaneous velocity, with 
the more usual one, used in kinematics, which refers to the limit of the average velocity when 
the variation of time tends towards zero. This weak notion of instantaneous velocity is 
compatible with the standard view of motion and velocity: it still defines velocity by reference 
to latter positions of the body, although very near ones. By contrast, what the upholders of 
intrinsic states of velocity have in mind is a strong and absolute notion of instantaneous 
velocity that does not make any reference to neighbouring times.  
Second, the debate between relationists and monadists concerning kinematic 
properties is quite distinct from the debate between relationists and absolutists concerning 
space. Indeed, Newton is a relationist about motion and an absolutist about space. He defines 
motion as the change of absolute position in space. True, the admission of absolute space 
introduces a distinction between apparent and absolute motions (that is, motion relative to 
other bodies, or motion relative to space). But we must distinguish between absolute motions 
and intrinsic ones. Absolute motion is still a relation between a body and the absolute space. It 
is non-relative only in the sense of being natural, non-conventional or non-arbitrary: it does 
not depend on a free decision concerning the frame of reference. Intrinsic motion, on the other 
hand, is a property that an object can have even when it is not moving relatively to absolute 
space.32 
The monadist about kinematic vectors who does not deny relations altogether has a 
richer ontology than the relationist: he does not deny, of course, that they are actual changes 
of position, namely relational motions and accelerations. But he claims that there are also 
intrinsic motions that cannot be construed as relational motions. How then are intrinsic states 
of motion and/or velocity to be connected with actual changes of positions during time—
extrinsic motions? The answer of the vector monadist is that the connection between changes 
of position on the one hand, and motion or velocity on the other, is not one of constitution or 
definition, but one of explanation. Vector velocity, far from being constituted by changes of 
position, explains them (Bigelow and Pargetter, 1990a: 65-66; Tooley, 1988: 238). If an 
object changes position, it is because he has instantaneous velocities at each time.  
The burden of proof clearly lies with the vector monadist. First, because its ontology is 
richer than the relationist’s one. Second, because the additional entities that monadists 
introduce (instantaneous motions, velocities, accelerations) are prima facie queer. Since 
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intrinsic and extrinsic velocities stand in a relation of physical explanation, it is possible that 
the ones occur without the others. For instance, it ought to be possible that an entity can 
possess an intrinsic velocity at each instant of its existence without ever moving. This sounds 
strange. Vector monadists, who introduce new and strange entities, owe us some arguments.  
Rather than reviewing these arguments33, I shall raise a general difficulty for vector 
monadism: it cannot account for the direction of vectors.  
Vectors have both a magnitude and a direction.  Let us assume that the magnitude of 
vectors can be accounted for in a monadist framework. That is, let us assume that quantities 
are monadic properties.34 Can direction be a monadic property, intrinsic to single bodies? We 
have first to understand more precisely the notion the direction of vectors.  
At first sight, direction appears to be one single feature of vectors, beside their 
magnitude. Indeed, it can be represented by one number: the most straightforward way to 
represent a vector in a two-dimensionnal plane is to use a value for its magnitude, and another 
value for its direction. The numerical value θ that represents the direction of the vector is the 
value of its angle from the abscissa, anticlockwise. But this is misleading: θ embed in fact two 
distinct features of forces and other vectors, which can be called their orientation and their 
sense. When we draw a vector, the length of the line represents the scalar magnitude of the 
vector. The inclination of the line in space  (its angle relatively to the abscissa) represents its 
orientation. The arrow on the line represents its sense. The important point is that once we 
have an oriented line (the line of action, for forces), we still need some information in order to 
know in what sense to put the arrowhead, which represent the sense of the vector. The very 
same oriented line can be travelled over in two ways. My argument against vector monadism 
is that none of these two features, orientation and sense, can be intrinsic to a single body. 
 
Vectors 
 
 
Direction Magnitude 
Orientation 
 
 
Sense 
 
 
Concerning orientation, the monadist faces two problems. First, in order to draw a 
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line, we need two points. How are we to draw the line of action of the force exerted by a body 
if we have only this single body? Orientation seems to be essentially a spatial relation. Note 
that orientation is not necessarily a spatial relation to other bodies. Orientation may also be a 
relation to a different part of the same body (the orientation of a line drawn on a single 
figure), to absolute space (the orientation of a single line), to another absolute space behind 
the absolute space we are considering (the orientation of the space itself, if there is one)... I 
suspect that the intuitions concerning “intrinsic orientation” fail to consider these other 
relations. Nothing can change its orientation without changing its relation to anything: it 
makes no sense to say that everything turns, truly everything. 
Second, even if the notion of an intrinsic orientation were meaningful, a specific 
problem would arise for force vectors: one would still have to explain how these intrinsically 
oriented forces might reach other bodies: the line of action of a force has to extend spatially 
beyond the body that exerts the force. Otherwise, forces would flounder around, being 
incapable of any influence on other bodies. But it seems that something that is (partly) outside 
a body cannot be (fully) intrinsic to it. Then, how can a purely intrinsic force reach other 
bodies?  
Concerning sense, the main difficulty is that the notion of sense is closely tied to the 
notion of asymmetry. Saying that a force has a sense, amounts to saying that it is exerted by a 
on b, but not by b on a. But asymmetry is a property of relations. Claiming that a monadic 
property is asymmetric is meaningless. If the monadist about vectors is to maintain that forces 
exert in a sense but not in the opposite one, he has to give us a notion of sense that is 
independent from the notion of asymmetry. The only suggestion I know is to equate monadic 
direction with dispositional or intentional directedness (I. Johansson, 2001; G. Molnar, 2003). 
I shall reject this suggestion latter, when discussing the hypothesis that forces are monadic 
dispositions. 
Another problem concerning the intrinsicality of sense is that in some cases the fact 
that a force has a given sense (say, that it is attractive and not repulsive) depends on other 
bodies. Think of the force that an electron exerts on other particles. Since its charge is 
negative, it will exert an attractive force on the positron coming into its vicinity. But it will 
exert a repulsive force on another electron entering its field. So apparently the force exerted 
by a particle depends on the nature of the other particles around. It is not intrinsic to one 
single particle35. 
Surprisingly, both Robinson (1989: 408) and Armstrong (1997: 79) recognise that the 
direction of vectors constitutes an important and unsolved problem for their monadist view. 
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Since direction is essential to vectors, this seems to me to be a sufficient reason for rejecting 
vector monadism.36 
 
2.2. Forces are not dispositional monadic properties 
 
So vectors cannot be categorical monadic properties. Could it be that they are 
dispositional monadic properties? According to the dispositionalist, (most or all) properties 
are actual powers essentially directed toward a possibly non-actual manifestation. Molnar 
calls this essential feature of monadic powers or dispositions their directedness (2003, 60sqq). 
Prima facie, the dispositionalist is in a far better position than the categoricalist: he can 
explain the directionality of vectors by resorting to the directedness of powers —the fact that 
powers essentially point to their manifestations. Dispositionalism seems to fit pretty well with 
the vectorial nature of forces.  
Somewhat surprisingly however, many dispositionalists such as Molnar, Ellis or 
Cartwright, though they emphasize the role of forces in ontology, do not explicitly claim that 
forces are dispositions. Rather, they consider forces as manifestations of intrinsic powers.37 
They do not seem to address the issue whether forces themselves are categorical or 
dispositional. Presumably, the hypothesis should be the following: forces are monadic powers 
whose manifestations are accelerations.38 They are dispositions to accelerate. Their vectorial 
directionality is explained by their dispositional directedness. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, there are I think two difficulties for this suggestion. First, 
if we are to explain monadic direction with the help of power directedness, we have to be sure 
that directedness is less mysterious that monadic direction. We may doubt that this is the case. 
Thus, Armstrong claims that if powers are properties pointing to some non-existing entities, 
directedness leads to a Meinongian metaphysics, which is no less mysterious.39  
Nevertheless, we do not need to reject the whole of dispositionalism in order to show 
that forces cannot be monadic powers. Indeed, the very analogy between vector’s 
directionality and power’s directedness is misleading. We’ve seen that the direction of forces 
is in fact a complex property that includes their orientation and their sense. None of them fits 
with the directedness of powers.  
Concerning orientation, we’ve seen that it requires a spatial relation between the body 
that exerts the force and some point outside it. Now, it is true that with the directedness we 
have two entities: the disposition itself and its possible manifestation. But these two entities 
clearly do not stand in a spatial relation to each other. First, when the manifestation is not 
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actual, there is presumably not any genuine relation at all,40 since one of the terms of the 
putative relation does not exist. Second, even when the manifestation occurs, it makes no 
sense to ask about the distance between the breaking of the glass and its fragility. Likewise, it 
is vain to try to draw a line between a force-power and an acceleration. It follows that the 
orientation of a vector has nothing to do with the directedness of a power.41 
Concerning sense, the dispositionalist may think that, contrary to the categoricalist, he 
has here a card to play: he may propose to reduce the asymmetry of vectors to the asymmetry 
of the relation between a power and its manifestation: the acceleration is a manifestation of 
the force but the force is not the manifestation of the acceleration. But this would be 
obviously fallacious: we are looking for an asymmetry inside the force itself, that is, inside the 
force-power. More exactly, we want an asymmetry in the very exertion of the force, not in its 
relation to its kinematic manifestation (as the static examples given in the first part show, 
exertion and kinematic manifestation of a force are very different things). Clearly, the 
proposed asymmetry is not of the right kind: once you know that the manifestation of a force 
is acceleration, you still do not know in what sense to put the arrow on the force.  
A better solution for the dispositionalist would be to argue that the asymmetry of a 
force-power is inherited from the asymmetry of its manifested acceleration.42 Once you know 
that the manifestation of a force is a determinate acceleration, you know in what sense to put 
the arrow on the force: namely, the sense in which the body would accelerate. But this is to 
put the cart before the horse: powers are supposed to explain or ground their manifestation, 
not the contrary. If the force-power has no direction by itself, why should its motion- or 
acceleration-manifestation be of such and such direction? The direction of the kinematic 
manifestations of forces would be entirely unpredictable. It follows that neither the 
orientation, nor the sense of forces can be explained by the directedness of powers.  
In conclusion, the directionality of vectors cannot be accounted for in any monadist 
framework. Forces are not monadic properties, categorical or dispositional43. They must be 
relations.  
 
3. Forces are symmetrical relations: Newton’s Third Law 
 
3.1. The thesis defended 
 
 So far, it has been argued that forces are real dynamical relations. I shall now argue 
that they are symmetrical relations. Most of relationalists about forces hold them to be non-
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symmetrical relations. J.C. Maxwell (1877: 26), P. Foulkes (1951: 176, 1952), M. Bunge 
(1959: 153), A. Newman (1992: 151) and R. Ingthorsson (2002) are notable exceptions.44 
Physicists also appear to assume that forces are symmetrical relations when they use the terms  
‘forces’ and ‘interaction’ interchangeably45. 
The argument I shall present in favour of the view that forces are symmetrical relations 
relies on Newton’s Third Law (to recall: To any action there is always an opposite and equal 
reaction; in other words, the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and 
always opposite in direction.). This law is acknowledged to be without exception in the 
macroscopic and mesoscopic world. It holds not only in static cases but also during 
accelerations: the force that a tow-horse exerts on a barge has the same magnitude as the 
opposite force that the barge exerts on the horse. These “two” forces are inside the system: 
trying to generate motion from them is as vain as blowing into the sail of the boat we are in. 
Accelerations are never to be explained by differences between action and reaction (since 
there are no such differences), but always by differences between forces belonging to distinct 
action-reaction pairs. Action and reaction are forces that apply to different objects. If we want 
to explain the acceleration of an object, we have to sum the forces that apply on that object. 
The reason why the barge accelerates is that the pulling force that the horse exerts on the 
barge is greater that the opposite friction force that the water exerts on it. 
If we agree that forces are relations, the most literal reading of the Third Law, 
however, is not that they are symmetrical relations. Rather, it is that forces are asymmetrical 
relations that come in action-reaction pairs. Each time a body a exerts a force on another body 
b, b exerts a second opposite force on a. There are two forces crossing between a and b. 
Newton’s Third Law appears to refer to pairs of asymmetrical forces. Now, is this literal 
reading the one that we should accept ontologically? The only thing that distinguishes the two 
forces of an action reaction pair is their arrow, that is, their sense. They share all their other 
properties: they always come together, they are determinates which fall under the same 
determinable, they relate the same entities, they have the same line of action (or orientation), 
the same magnitude and the same spatial location46. Therefore, to ask whether we should read 
the Third Law literally amounts to asking: ontologically, should we take the sense of forces 
seriously? There are I think three reasons to answer negatively. 
First, it is not clear how we can distinguish action and reaction by observation. If we 
put a dynamometer between the two bodies, is it registering the intensity of the first force or 
of the second one? If we put our finger between them, do we feel the pressure of a on b, or the 
pressure of b on a?  
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The second argument in favour of the symmetry of forces relies on Ockhamist 
considerations. The view according to which forces are symmetrical is more economical: in 
order to account for an interaction between two bodies a and b, the upholder of asymmetrical 
forces needs then four entities: a, b, the force that a exerts on b and the reciprocal force that b 
exerts on a. There would be two crossing asymmetrical forces between the bodies. On the 
other hand, if we adopt symmetrical forces, we need only three entities: a, b, and the force 
between them. 
The third reason in favour of symmetrical forces I put forward is an argument by 
analogy. Like force, the distance from a body a to a body b can be represented by a distance 
vector (although distance-vectors are more rare than displacement ones, they are quite 
respectable vectors). We can then express the following “law”: 
 
To any distance there is always an opposite and equal distance; in other words, the 
distances from one body to the other are always equal and always opposite in 
direction. 
 
 “Distance” being here understood as a vector, this is undoubtedly true. But does it 
follow that there are two asymmetrical distances relations between a and b, namely, the 
distance from a to b and the distance from b to a? This would be highly counter-intuitive. The 
truth is rather that there is only one symmetrical distance between a and b. Asymmetry here is 
only introduced in the picture as a convenient means to focus on a single system, taking the 
other one as the referential. Asymmetry is a feature of the vectorial representation of 
distances, not of distances themselves. Likewise, consider the two sentences: 
 
 (1)  “Fabrice is five meters from Kevin” 
 (2) “Kevin is five meters from Fabrice”  
 
 (1) and (2) are certainly two ways of referring to a same fact, namely, that Fabrice and Kevin 
are five meters apart. That there are different sentences here and that each sentence appears to 
present distance in an “arrowed” way does not indicate a genuine difference in the fact 
referred to by those sentences. 
If true, given the strong analogy between the distance’s law and Newton’s Third Law, 
there is no reason to consider the asymmetry of forces-vector, but not the asymmetry of 
distance vectors, to be of ontological importance. Likewise, the asymmetry of forces is only a 
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feature of their vectorial representations, but not of forces themselves. Forces are symmetrical 
relations, which may be referred to through asymmetrical representations, namely vectors.  
Note that stressing the analogy between forces and distances as regards symmetry does 
not undermine their key difference, pointed out in the introduction: distances are symmetrical 
spatial relations, while force are symmetrical dynamical relations irreducible to mere spatial 
relations. 
Those three reasons (observability, economy, analogy) suggests the following more 
general metaphysical principle: 
 
(SR) For any two particulars, if their exemplifying an instance of what appears to be 
an asymmetrical relation necessitates their exemplifying another instance of that very 
same relation but in opposite sense, then what they exemplify is in fact one and the 
same instance of a symmetrical relation. 
 
A problem remains: if forces are symmetrical relations how are we to account for the 
distinction between attractive and repulsive forces, between tensions and pressures? The usual 
way of capturing these distinctions is by using the notion of opposite directions: attractive and 
repulsive forces are forces that have the same module and line of action and the same point of 
application, but have opposite directions.47 If Fab means “the force exerted on a by b”, and if 
we focus on the body a, an attractive force of b on a will be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the opposite, a repulsive force exerted on a by b is represented thus, still focusing 
on a: 
 
 
 
 
 
Fab 
 A  B 
(an attractive force exterted upon a by b) 
Fab 
 A 
(a repulsive force exerted upon a by b) 
 B 
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The key feature that allows us to distinguish between attraction and repulsion, or 
tension and pressure is, then, the direction of forces, and more especially their sense. How are 
we to secure these distinctions if the sense of forces is given up?  
My proposal is to introduce a new feature of symmetrical forces, namely their 
polarity. Symmetrical forces are either repulsive, or attractive. This is a primitive feature of 
forces that cannot be explained away.48 Polarity is compatible with symmetry. The repulsive 
forces (such as pressures) tend to move away the objects they relate, while the attractive 
forces (such as tensions) tend to bring them closer. We should think of forces in the following 
way:  
 
Attractive forces: 
 
 
 
 
Repulsive forces: 
 
 
 
 
If Newtonians forces are symmetrical relations, how is it that Newton and many 
followers appear to conceive them as asymmetrical? One first reason may be that they tend to 
confuse the property of the representations of forces (vectors) with the property of forces 
themselves. The second possible reason for the common belief that forces are asymmetrical 
relations is that Newton, like many of his followers, conceived of forces in terms of muscular 
effort.49 But effort implies an asymmetric relation between the active term (the voluntary 
subject) and the passive one (the resisting object). That is, the presence of a conation 
introduces an asymmetry between the exerter and the exerted upon. Conceiving forces on the 
basis of voluntary effort leads to an anthropomorphic notion of forces, as many opponents of 
forces have rightly pointed out since Hume: conations (intentions, volitions, tryings…) being 
essential to effort and being also mental episodes, any conception of physical forces in terms 
of effort tends to endow force-exerting bodies with the power of willing or intending. This is 
one important reason to prefer the sense of touch (cutaneous pressure perception) to the sense 
of effort in the epistemology of forces50.  
 
 
 A  B 
 B  A 
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3.2. Objections answered 
 
Four objections can be raised against the view that Newtonian forces are symmetrical 
relations.  
(i) First, this view appears to undermine the argument of the second part, according to 
which forces are relations rather than monadic properties. The argument was that the only 
way to account for the direction of forces is to conceive them as relations. Now if forces are 
symmetrical the argument collapses, or so it seems. This worry is misguided for two reasons. 
First, I claimed that the direction of vector should be analysed in terms of orientation and 
sense. Now, if forces are symmetrical they have indeed no sense, but they still have 
orientation. The argument against the intrinsicness of orientation still applies to symmetrical 
forces. Second, symmetry (as well as asymmetry) is a property of relations. Forces could no 
be symmetrical if they were monadic properties of single bodies.  
One thing that I have not shown, however, is that forces cannot be monadic properties 
of pairs or sums of bodies. To use Russell’s terminology, I have objected to force-monadism, 
but not to force-monism51. Monadism reduces each relation to monadic properties of each 
relata. Monism reduces each relation to a single monadic property of the two relata taken 
together. The main objection to monism is its inability to deal with non-symmetrical relations. 
If forces are indeed symmetrical relations, they may be reduced to monadic properties of sums 
of bodies. I have nothing to object to such an option. My only point is that forces cannot be 
monadic properties of single bodies. 
(ii) Second, one may object that the thesis of the symmetry of forces leads to the 
rejection of the whole vectorial calculus of forces. If forces are not single but double arrows, 
then vectorial representation of forces becomes seriously misleading and should therefore be 
abandoned in favour of a more straightforward representation of forces, which would reflect 
their symmetry. 
The answer, I believe, is that even if vectors are potentially misleading representation 
of reality, they are still very useful. We should endorse instrumentalism about force-vectors, 
at least for their “sense” constituent. The reason why vectors are convenient representations 
lies in the fact that force vectors are monadic reductions or derelativisation of true relations, 
as argued by Newman (1992: 151, 197): they are “one-sided way of looking at a force 
relation, and it is the force relation that has the claim to being an element of reality”. The 
monadic property of “being pressed upon by B” is an abundant, non-natural one, which is 
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only a linguistic way to refer to the sparse or natural pressure relation that holds between A 
and B. The two sentences “A has the property of being pressed upon by B” and “B has the 
property of being pressed upon by A” have the same truthmaker, the fact that A and B enter in 
a pressure relation. Monadic reductions shouldn’t be taken literally, as far as metaphysics is 
concerned. But they are useful because they allow us to focus on a single body in a net of 
interacting bodies. 
(iii) The third objection to thesis of the symmetry of forces argues that we can express 
analogues of Newton’s Third Law not only with symmetrical relations like distances, but also 
with relations that are clearly asymmetric. From the relation is heavier than we can construe 
the following “law”: 
 
To any “heavier than” relation between two bodies there is always an opposite and 
equal “lighter than” relation between these bodies; in other words, the differences of 
weight between two bodies have always the same absolute value and are always 
opposite in sign. 
 
We presumably do not want to conclude nevertheless that instances of “heavier than” 
and “lighter than” should be fused into single symmetrical relation. So principle (SR) must be 
false. Therefore, if F stands for “exerts a force on”, the fact that aFb and bFa imply each 
other, according to Newton’s Third Law, should not suggest that the two asymmetrical forces 
should be fused together into one symmetrical relation. The only conclusion that we are 
entitled to draw from Newton’s Third Law is that all forces have a converse, not that all 
forces are symmetrical.  So the objection claims. 
The mistake in that objection is the following. The proposed principle (SR) makes 
clear that the two (apparent) instances of the asymmetrical relation must be of opposite 
senses. But it is not the case that a>b and b<a are of opposite senses. The sense of a relation 
can be written out in two different ways. Either we use the place of the arguments: the relation 
R(x, y) has not the same sense as the relation R(y, x). Or we use the notation for converse 
relations: R (x, y) has not the same sense as R-1 (x, y). There are then two different 
conventions in order to invert the sense of the relation R (x, y): R (y, x) or R-1 (x, y). Now, if 
we use both notational devices at once, then we come back, so to speak, to the first relation. 
The following formula is a logical truth: 
 
(A)          (x)(y) [R (x, y)  ⇔ R-1 (y, x)]  
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Likewise, in ordinary language the propositions “John loves Mary” and “Mary is loved 
by John” are equivalent. These two propositions have the same truthmaker: they are just two 
ways of denoting a same relational fact. We have just changed the place of the arguments 
(Mary and John) and inverted the expression of the relation, here by using passive voice. It 
should be clear now that this is precisely what happens when we pass from “a is heavier than 
b” to “b is lighter than a”. Although the linguistic presentation has changed, the sense of the 
represented relational fact is the same. These two expressions do not refer to different 
relational facts of opposite sense.52 So the proposed principle (SR) simply does not apply to 
this kind of expressions: it does not imply that non-symmetrical relations are indeed 
symmetrical ones. 
By contrast, it is clear from Newton’s Third Law that action and reaction are of 
opposite sense. The law does not state only that if the horse pulls the barge, then the barge is 
pulled by the horse (if so, the law would be completely trivial). It states that if the horse pulls 
the barge, then the barge pulls the horse. So the law should be written, logically, as follows:  
 
  (B)             (x)(y) [F(x, y) →  F(y, x)]   
 
 Unlike (A), (B) is not a logical truth.  
 
(iv) The fourth objection claims that the view that forces are symmetrical implies that 
Newton’s Third Law is conceptually or metaphysically necessary, while it is indeed only a 
nomologically necessary law. Newton clearly considered his Third Law as a metaphysically 
contingent, empirically testable one:  
 
I have tested this with a lodestone and iron. If these are placed in separate vessels 
that touch each other and float side by side in still water, neither one will drive the 
other forward, but because of the equality of the attraction in both directions they 
will sustain their mutual endeavours toward each other, and at last, having 
attained equilibrium, they will be at rest. (1999/1687: 428). 
 
 Since we can confront the Third Law with observation, it seems that it could have 
been the case that action and reaction were not equal. The thesis of the symmetry of forces 
appears to make it a metaphysically necessary truth when it is a metaphysically contingent 
one. There are two possible attitudes for the upholder of symmetrical forces here.  
First, he can bite the bullet and accept that Newton’s Third Law is only a matter of 
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nomological necessity. As a result, he will have to claim that forces are symmetrical only in 
Newtonian worlds. 
A second answer, which I favour, is to claim that Newton’s Third Law states in fact a 
metaphysical necessity, and to argue the conceivability of its violations is indeed a modal 
mistake. The impression we have that Newton’s Third Law could be violated may be just 
wrong. Consider the law according to which “The distance from a to b equals the distance 
from b to a”. Plausibly, this law is metaphysically necessary. Nevertheless one can conceive 
of tests in which it would fail to be confirmed. Take your meter rule, put the zero on a and 
read the distance from b. Then return it, put the zero on b and read the distance from a. If the 
two distances are the same, the law is verified (or non-falsified). But suppose that the two 
distances read on the rule are different. Would we say that the law according to which 
distances are symmetrical has been empirically falsified? Certainly not: we would rather 
assume or postulate some hidden interfering factors. We will assume, for instance, that a and 
b have invisibly moved relatively to each other, or that the meter rule somehow changed of 
length. Now, the same holds with Newton’s Third Law. How are we to test it? If the 
dynamometer does not indicate the same intensity between a and b and between b and a, we 
will assume, for instance, that a variation of the force between a and b occurred. Is Newton’s 
experiment more crucial? Imagine the two vessels had described a continuously accelerated 
motion. Here again, we have the alternative of rejecting the Third Law, or postulating another 
force external to the system of the two vessels. Most physicists would be strongly inclined 
toward the second option.53  
 
4. Forces are not causal relations 
 
It has been argued that forces are real symmetrical relations. I shall now argue that they 
are not causal relations. To say that forces are non-causal relations, or that they are not causal 
relations is ambiguous. It can mean either that forces have no causal powers, which amounts 
to say that they cannot be causes; or it can mean that forces are not species of causal relations, 
that is, that they are not themselves a sub-type of the relation of causality or causation. When I 
say that forces are not causal relations, this is only to be understood in this second sense: 
forces are not species of causation. I do not intend to deny that forces have causal powers (= 
can be causes). Au contraire.54 
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Hume endorses those two theses: (1) forces are species of singular causation. (2) There 
is no singular causation. Most realists about forces as relations disagree with him on the 
second thesis because they agree with him on the first one. They consider themselves to be 
defending the existence of singular causal relations. Thus Strawson (1987), Bigelow, Ellis, 
Pargetter (1988), Fales (1990), Newman (1992), or Johansson (2004:177 sqq.)55 claim that 
forces are species of causal relations.56 Some even go so far as to identify every type of 
causation with forces (Bigelow and Pargetter, 1990). True, forces, as dynamical relations, are 
clearly relations that contradict the thesis of humean supervenience: they are relations that are 
not spatio-temporally reducible. But it is a mistake to jump from the premises that forces are 
non-humean relations to the conclusion that they are singular causal relations. I believe that 
forces and causation are two different things. This is not to say that forces have no causal 
powers. Obviously they have: they make a difference in the motions of physical bodies. But 
the same is true of distances, and we do not want to claim that distances are species of causal 
relations. Forces, rather, are relata of causal relations. They are causes and effects. But they 
are not causations. Why? 
There are two versions of the view that forces are causal relations. The strong one, 
endorsed by Bigelow & Pargetter (1990) has it that all forces are causal relations and that all 
causal relations are forces. The weak one, which is more widespread, claims that all forces are 
causal relations but that some causal relations are not forces. 
Let us start with the strong view. There are two objections to it. First, forces are 
symmetrical relations, while causation is traditionally understood as having a direction or 
sense: one distinguishes causes from effects. This direction of causation is often connected 
with the claim that causes precede their effects (if there is such precedence, one can reduce 
the direction of causation to the direction of time, or reduce the direction of time to the 
direction of causation). But it needs not be the case: even if all causation is simultaneous57, it 
may still have a direction or sense: if flows from the cause to the effect, and not the reverse. 
 Because of Newton’s Third Law, there is no way of distinguishing, when two bodies 
press against each other, which one is the cause and which is the effect. So forces and causal 
relations cannot be identical. One could bite the bullet and claim that the direction or sense of 
causation is a feature that should be given up. But this amounts to an important revision of our 
ordinary concept of causation, since it asks us to admit causal relations without a distinction 
between causes and effects. I take it that ceteris paribus, we should prefer the view that 
minimizes the revision of our commonsense beliefs: therefore, the view according to which 
causation is a symmetrical relation should be adopted only faute de mieux.  
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 A second objection to the strong view goes as follows. Nothing positive has been said 
so far about the relation between forces and accelerations, except that it is not identity. The 
most intuitive and common account of this relation is that forces cause accelerations. Since 
Newton at least, forces are said to cause, to produce, or to generate accelerations or quantity 
of motion. It is natural to say, for instance, that the pressure of the water caused the collapse 
of the dam, or that the attraction of the moon causes the tides. Besides, contrary to forces, the 
relation between forces and accelerations has a sense: the collapses of the dam did not cause 
the pressure of the water. All this suggests that it may well be a causal relation. I shall 
therefore assume that Newton’s Second Law is a causal law. Such an assumption is 
completely neutral regarding the very nature of the causal relation: maybe it is a primitive 
metaphysical relation, maybe it can be analysed in terms of regularity, counterfactual 
dependence, existential dependence, powers, intervention, transference, conserved 
quantity…The only point here is that is that the relation between forces and accelerations 
must be a causal one, however we construe causality. 
  Now, it is clear that this causal connexion is not itself a force: forces do not 
themselves exert forces on accelerations. (Forces are not force exerter. And nothing can press 
on an acceleration. The relata of the forces relations are bodies.) Then some causal relations 
are not forces. The strong view is false. 
 Now consider the weak view according to which forces are only a type of causal 
relations among others. Such a view can dispose of the argument from the direction of 
causation in the following way. It may be that some types of causal relations have a direction, 
while some other types (namely, forces) have no direction. The type “causal relation” would 
be a non-symmetrical relation, with certain asymmetrical sub-types and other symmetrical 
ones. If so, the argument from symmetry is only a straightforward argument against the strong 
view that all causal relations are forces. By contrast, the view that forces are one type of 
causal relation among others only asks for a limited revision of our ordinary view about 
causation. In some cases, there is no cause-effect distinction, no causal direction. Such a 
modest revision may seem acceptable. In the same way, the weak view can dismissed the 
second objection to the strong view by claiming that forces on the one hand and the causal 
relations between forces and accelerations on the other, are causal relations of different types. 
But because it multiplies the different species of causation, the weak view is open to the 
following general objection: 
 
  (i) Causation is a natural kind. 
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  (ii) If forces were causal relations, they would be strongly disanalogous to the 
  others  types of causal relations. 
  ∴ Forces are not causal relations. 
 
 The first premise should be adopted by any realist about causality: causal relations 
must have something in common, they must resemble in some way, independently of our 
perception or our thinking about them. It is because all causal relations share something that 
they fall under the concept of causality, not the reverse. The second premise needs to be 
argued for. In order to distinguish the relations between forces and accelerations from forces, 
let us call it production (forces are then said to produce accelerations: forces are relata of 
production). There are at least six important disanalogies between these two types of alleged 
causal relations, forces and productions. 
 (i) Forces are symmetrical relations while productions are asymmetrical ones  (If a 
exerts a force on b, b exerts a force on a. But if a force F produces an acceleration a, a does 
not produces F).  
 (ii) The relata of forces are bodies (which may in turn be analysed in terms of fields, 
masses, locations…) while the relata of production are relations between bodies (forces) and 
changes in the relations between bodies (accelerations). 
 (iii) Consequently, forces are first-order relations while production is a second-order 
relation, since one of its relata at least is a relation (a force). 
 (iv) Production is a necessary connection in the sense that one of its terms (resultant 
forces) necessitates the other (accelerations) — however one construe necessitation (in terms 
of logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, regularity…). Given one term, it is necessary that 
the other occurs. Forces, one the other hand, are not relation of necessitation: the bodies that 
enter in a force relation do not necessitate each other. 
 (v) Forces have causal powers: when not counteracted by other forces, they cause 
accelerations (they keep those causal powers even when they are counteracted). But it is not 
clear that the very production relation between forces and accelerations has itself any causal 
power. Certainly, the production relation confers causal powers to its relata (forces are causes 
in virtue of producing accelerations), but plausibly it does not itself possess causal powers 
(one should not be confused by the fact that production is a necessitation relation: this does 
not mean that production itself necessitates, but only that one of its terms necessitates the 
other). My argument for that claim is that any realist about causation should admit that some 
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causal relations at least have no causal power (=cannot be causes), on pain of regress. If every 
causal relation had causal power, then every causal relation would have not only causes and 
effects as its relata, but would also be itself the relatum of another causal relation, which 
would in turn be the relatum of a third causal relation, etc. Besides, it is difficult to see both 
what new species of causal relation would relate production to its effects, and what new 
species of effect production would then bring about58. Therefore, the causal relation between 
forces and accelerations seems to be the right place to stop in order to avoid the causal 
regress: it is a causal relation that has no causal powers, that is not itself a cause. To be clear: 
there are two senses in which a relation can be said to be “causal”: either we mean that it is a 
possible cause, which amounts to saying that it has causal powers; or we mean that it is a 
relation of causation. I am arguing that forces are causal in the first sense, but not in the 
second, while production is causal in the second sense, but not in the first.  If, on the opposite, 
one were to maintain that forces are also causal relations in the second sense (that forces are 
causations), then one would have to say that some types of causation have causal powers 
(forces) while some other (production) are causally impotent.  
 (vi) This leads to the sixth disanology between forces and production. Forces are 
material relations, while production is a formal relation (like resemblance, identity, parthood, 
logical consequence, existential dependence, instantiation in Armstrong’s theory of states of 
affairs, compresence…):59 though production is a real relation, it is not a new element in 
reality, in addition to its relata. Production is an internal relation that supervenes on its terms 
and comes ontologically for free, unlike forces. Here is an argument for that claim. According 
to a common metaphysical principle, dubbed  “The Eleatic Principle” (Oddie, 1982), or 
“Alexander’s Dictum” (Kim, 1993: 348sqq): 
 
 Everything that is real (as Frege says, “wirklich”) possesses causal powers (can 
 “wirken”) 
 
If this is true, the production relation, since it has no causal power, cannot be real, 
unlike forces. Then the difference between forces and the relation between forces and 
acceleration becomes crucial: forces are real, while the production relation is not real. Such a 
conclusion would definitely secure the view that forces and production are strongly distinct 
relations. But it is certainly too hasty. The fact that the Eleatic principle entails anti-realism 
about certain causal relations at least (here, production) can as well be considered as a good 
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reason to reject the principle itself. The Eleatic Principle should certainly be qualified. A first 
proposal is due to D.M. Armstrong (1997: 41): 
 
 Everything that exists makes a difference to the causal powers of something. 
 
 One of the advantages of this new version, according to Armstrong, is to allow for the 
reality of causal relations, which have no causal power (=which cannot themselves be causes). 
Such a revised principle, nevertheless, faces two problems. First, it implies that 
epiphenomenal properties, which are effects but cannot be causes, are real: they make a 
difference to the causal powers of their cause. This is a problem since the Eleatic Principle is 
often used as an argument against epiphenomenal properties. Secondly, this revised principle 
contains a hidden disjunction: everything that exists either has causal powers or confers 
causal powers on other entities. Nothing ensures that the two disjuncts have anything in 
common. If so, Armstrong’s revised principle is ad hoc. A better revision of the Eleatic 
Principle, which avoids the two previous objections, goes as follows: 
 
 Everything that is material possesses causal powers. 
 
This principle does not exclude the reality of causally impotent entities, but only their 
materiality.  
Granting that such a principle is the best way to capture the intuition behind the Eleatic 
Principle, we should now say that the relation between forces and accelerations is a non-
material one. This could mean that production is an immaterial relation. An example could be 
some version of Malebranchism, which identifies causal relations with God’s interventions. 
But few people, including dualists, are willing to claim that such immaterial connexions are 
required in the explanation of the physical world.  A better interpretation of the view that 
production is not a material relation is that it is neither material, nor immaterial: production 
may well be a formal relation. Such relations are internal, in the sense of being nothing 
“more” than their terms, they are no to be reified. They have no causal powers. But they still 
are real, connecting different entities without being anything “more” than them. This is not 
the place to argue in favour of formal relations (many arguments in their favour point to the 
threat of a regress if we reject them. For instance, “Russell’s Resemblance Regress’, or the 
regress that threatens if exemplification is conceived as a material relation). The point is only 
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that once we agree that there are some formal relations, the best way to deal with production 
is to claim that it is a formal relation.   
 As a result, there are six important disanalogies between forces and production. Only 
one of the two can deserve the label “causation”, on pain of dismantling causation. We have 
seen that production has a good right to be called “causation”. There is, on the other hand, 
some reasons to think that forces are not instances of causation. First, they have no direction. 
Second, as this spreadsheet makes clear, forces are more like distances than like production: 
 
Production 
 
Force Distance 
Non-symmetrical relation Symmetrical relation Symmetrical relation 
Relata= relations between 
bodies 
Relata= bodies Relata=bodies 
Second-order 
relation 
First-order relation First-order relation 
Necessitation relation Not a relation of 
necessitation 
Not a relation of 
necessitation 
Has no causal powers 
 
Possesses causal power Possesses causal power 
Formal relation Material relation Material relation 
 
Distances have causal powers (they are not epiphenomenal), but they are clearly not 
causal relations in the sense of being themselves kinds of causation. Since forces are more 
akin to distances than to production, they presumably are not a species of causation. They are 
causal relata, but not causal relations. On the view defended here, then, there are (at least) 
three basic types of external relations in the material world: spatial, temporal, and dynamic 
ones. These three fundamental kinds of relations have causal powers, which mean that they 
can be causes, but there are not species of causal relations themselves. 
I conclude that forces are real symmetrical relations, but that they are not species of 
causation. 
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1 Realists about newtonian forces include R. Boscovitch (1966/1763), L. Euler (1750—see Gaukroger, 1982 and 
C. Boudri, 2002), I. Kant (2000/1786), B. Bolzano (1972/1837, see A. Konzelmann Ziv, to appear), L. Creary 
(1981), G. Strawson (1987), M. Tooley (1988), E. Fales (1990), A. Newman (1992), D.M. Armstrong (1997) , 
G. Molnar (2003), I. Johansson (2004) and J. Wilson (2007). J. Bigelow, B. Ellis, R. Pargetter (1988) have also 
defended realism about forces though not newtonian ones : the relata of forces, according to them, aren’t bodies, 
but fields and particles. 
Anti-realist about forces, on the other hand, include G. Berkeley (De Motu, 1721/1975; Siris, 1744/1975), D. 
Hume (2000/1739), P.L.M. Maupertuis (1756), d’Alembert (1758— See Boudri 2002), L. Carnot (1803, 
Préface), G. Kirchhoff,  H. Hertz (1899), H. Poincaré (1902), B. Russell (1992 /1903), E. Mach (1904), C.D. 
Broad (1923: 166 sqq.),  B. Ellis (1965, 1976), M. Jammer (1999/1957), B. van Fraassen (1980).  
2 P.L.M. Maupertuis (see Jammer 1999: 210), E. Mach (1904: 239), M. Hesse (1962: 136sqq).  
3 Another equivalent formulation is that the force is the rate of change of momentum (or quantity of motion) : F= 
d(mv)/dt  
4 Before stating the Second Law, Newton gave a definition of mass in Definition 1. 
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5 L. Creary, 1981: 152. 
6 See also R. Feynman, 1999: 158sqq. Note that this assertion is compatible with anti-realism about forces (to 
which Broad subscribed). 
7 Trickily, the term « kinetics » is often used in physics as a synonym to « dynamics ». 
8 For such a use of the dynamic/kinematic distinction in philosophy see Heil (1983: 38-39).  
9 Note that statics is then a part of dynamics, since it explains the absence of motion with the same kinds of 
dynamical entities. 
10 Strictly speaking, Newton does not use the notion of vector but he comes very close to it: he attributes to 
forces both a module and a direction to force, and uses the method of parallelogram to add forces (1999, Law 3, 
Corollary1). 
11 One may worry about the proposal that the way forces are represented should enter in the definition of forces. 
But note that this definition is only preliminary in the sense that it intends to leave open as many options as 
possible concerning further debates. It should be able to make room for the debate between realist and anti-
realist about forces, but also for divergent realists conceptions of forces. One disagreement among the realists, as 
we shall see in the third part, opposes those who think that forces do indeed have a direction to those who hold 
that direction is only a feature of the representations of forces, but not of forces themselves. 
 
12 I’m not considering forces fields here, which might be regarded as substances. They might be analysed as 
bundle of forces, or as bundle of dispositions to exert forces. If so, fields are not a basic kind of dynamical 
entities. 
13 See Jammer, 1957: 124sqq. According to him,  Newton « came very near to the operational concept of force 
and gravitation » (1999 : 203). For the opposite interpretation, see I. Bernard Cohen (2002). 
14 See for instance L. Carnot (1804), B. Russell (1992/1903: 483), C.D. Broad (1923: 166 sqq.), M. Jammer 
(1999:  245) and B. Ellis (1976: 183-184). 
15 1968: 85-88. 
16 Feynman, claims that Newtonian and Lagrangian dynamics are “exactly equivalent”. 
17 Wilson (2007). 
18 In 1899, Hertz pointed out that “there is no text-book of mechanics which from the start teaches the subject 
from the standpoint of energy, and introduces the idea of energy before the idea of force” (2003:14). This seems 
to remain true today, to a large extent. The explanation of this didactic order may lie in the perceptibility of 
forces by contrast to energy. 
19 Cartwright, 1983: 54-73. 
20 Creary, 1981; Johansson, 2004: 167-168; Molnar 2003:194-8. 
21 Mill 1893: Book III, ch.VI., Forster, 1988. Although he does not explicitly endorse this view, the argument of 
Sheldon(1985) can be used to support it. 
22 Bigelow and Pargetter, 1990b: 108. 
23 In recent years, relationism about forces has been endorsed by authors such as G. Strawson (1987), J. Bigelow, 
B. Ellis and R. Pargetter (1988), J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter (1990b), E. Fales (1990),  A. Newman (1992, 
2002), I. Johansson (2001, 2004), R. Ingthorsson (2002). 
24 Following Russell, 1903, §212sqq. Concerning vectors, monadism seems to be the rule rather than the 
exception. Thus Lewis (1999: 226) writes: “…Vector-valued magnitudes may count as intrinsic properties. What 
else could they be? Any attempt to reconstrue them as relational properties seems seriously artificial.” 
25 I borrow the distinction between categorical and dispositional properties from Armstrong (see notably 1997: 
69 sqq.). Note that dispositional properties claim to be as actual as categorical ones: what may be non-actual, if 
the dispositionalists are right, are not the dispositions themselves but their manifestations. 
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26 Armstrong 1997 : 92 ; Molnar 2003: 39sqq ; 159.  
27 “all perfectly natural properties come out intrinsic”, D. Lewis, “New work for a theory of universals”, 1999: 
27. 
28 If forces were causal relations, this would entail causal singularism: the fact that two entities are in causal 
relation does not depend of any fact outside these entities and their relations to each other at that time (contrary 
to humean views about causation). 
29 Actually, Bigelow and Pargetter (1990: 70) also claim that forces constitute intrinsic monadic properties of 
bodies. Nevertheless this seems to contradict their later claim (1990: 282-285) that forces are relations. I’m not 
sure how they intend to reconcile those two claims. Since the second one is developed at length in a discussion 
focused on forces, while the first one is mentioned in the course on a more general discussion concerning 
vectors, I shall consider them as holding that forces are relations.  
30 See also P. Forrest (1984), D. Dieks (2001) and I. Johansson (2001, 2004: 161-170). 
31 This is controversial: Johansson (2001, 2004 : 161sqq.) is a monadist concerning accelerations, but a 
relationalist concerning forces: monadism about accelerations does not entail monadism about forces. 
32 Note that there may be nevertheless a more subtle way in which the idea of absolute space introduces the idea 
of intrinsic state of motion: as soon as we asks about the motion of the absolute space itself, one common answer 
is that absolute space is intrinsically immobile. The immobility of absolute space is not relative to any other 
frame of reference. Absolute space, or its origin, would be the only bearer of an intrinsic state of motion. One 
other option, which seems preferable, is to claim that it does not make sense to ask whether absolute space is 
moving or not, for the very same reason that it does not make sense to ask whether time accelerates. 
33 On usual strategy of vector monadists is put forward real or imaginary cases where we are drawn to apply 
kinematic concepts despite the absence of extrinsic motions or velocities. I shall only mention one example 
proposed by Bigelow and Pargetter, which is dubbed Newton’s Cradle. It is intended to show that some intrinsic 
kinematical vectors are present even in absence of any relational motion. Two rigid spheres a and b, of the same 
size and mass, hang in contact with each other. A third sphere c, of the same size and mass, moving along the 
line joining the centres of a and b, hits the sphere b with velocity V. Then c stops, b remains motionless and a 
moves off with velocity V along the same line. Bigelow and Pargetter draw the following conclusion: 
The velocity of a is transferred from a, through b, to c. There is a moment in time when b has velocity V even 
though there is no appropriate series of past or future positions for b which will yield velocity V as a limit … 
Instantaneous velocity does not entail any sequence of position which generates a mathematical limit.(1990a: 
67).  
(As pointed out to me by XXX and XXX, it may be unfortunate that Bigelow and Pargetter speaks here of 
velocities rather than accelerations or momentum). The argument appears to be the following: 
(i) In certain cases, objects that have no extrinsic velocities nevertheless mediate the extrinsic velocities 
of other objects. 
∴ Some mediating process must occur in such stationary objects. 
(ii) Only velocities can mediate velocities. 
∴ Some intrinsic velocities occur in objects that mediate extrinsic velocities. 
The intermediate conclusion sounds plausible: the momentum and kinetic energy of a and c are the same, so they 
must somehow having been conserved in “passing through” b. The argument points, rightly, to the need of a 
mediating process in b, between the motions of c and a. But why should this mediating process in b take the 
form of a velocity? It is not the case that a mediating process is necessarily of the same kind that the mediated 
ones. It is not the case that the only way for a quantity to be conserved is to pass through a medium without 
undergoing any change. There are reversible laws that connect kinematic magnitudes with dynamic ones: 
Newton’s Second Law connects force and masse with acceleration. The principle of conservation of energy 
connects kinetic energy with potential energy. Why do not describe the process that occurred in b in terms of 
potential energy, or force? 
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The upholder of intrinsic velocities may reply that both intrinsic velocities and forces are involved in that 
process, but then he has to say more about their relation and to explain why they are not redundant. Since we can 
explain the mediation just in terms of forces, the motivation for introducing intrinsic velocities is still missing. 
Once we have forces, intrinsic velocities appear to be pointless. Here is a possible explanation of this 
redundancy: it may be that the only grip that we have on the notion of instantaneous velocity (or instantaneous 
acceleration) comes from our concept of force. The suggestion is that all alleged monadic kinematical properties 
are in fact disguised dynamical properties or relations. If so, an ontology with instantaneous velocity (or 
accelerations) and forces is redundant. And an ontology with instantaneous velocities (or accelerations) but no 
forces cheats. Robinson (1989) finally recognises something close to this suggestion. While he postulates 
intrinsic “quasi-qualities” of motion in order to save Humean supervenience he points out that it is actually not 
clear that such qualities of motion are in fact compatible with the spirit of Humean supervenience. 
Johansson (2004: 163 sqq.) suggests two different original arguments in favour of intrinsic states of acceleration, 
which he calls alternatively “partial acceleration”, “non-realized acceleration” and “tendencies to accelerates” 
(which are distinct from forces according to him). First, they make sense Newton's Second Law as far as 
component forces are concerned. I claimed (1.2.) that Newton’s Second Law was only true for resultant forces, 
but Johansson maintains that it also holds for components ones. Since each component force does not yield 
acceleration, Johansson has to claim that it still causes a tendency to accelerate. This argument sounds circular to 
me: the only way to justify the truth of a “component version” of Second Law is to assume the existence of 
partial accelerations, but then one cannot ground the existence of acceleration on the truth of that second Second 
Law.  
Second, Johansson stresses (in correspondence) that we need truthmakers for our ascriptions of tendencies to 
accelerate to bodies and that those truthmakers must be intrinsic to the bodies in question. I agree with the need 
for truthmakers but not with the need for intrinsic ones: what makes true that the painting hanging on the wall 
tends to fall is the gravitational force-relation between it and the earth. This is not something intrinsic to the 
painting. As a result, I think that the “component version” of the second law simply does not hold, and that 
partial acceleration and forces are indeed redundant in Johansson’s ontology. This has the advantage of avoiding 
both the debatable notion of “non-realized accelerations” and the splitting in two of the Second Law. 
34 This has been disputed by Bigelow and Pargetter, 1988. See Armstrong, 1988 for an answer. 
35 Note that this extends to vectorial fields. The field of a positively charged particle is represented by lines 
flowing out from the charge and the field of a negatively charged particle is represented by lines flowing in 
toward the charge. But these representations are purely conventional: they rely on the arbitrary choice of a 
positive test charge. The field of a positive charge is not intrinsically repulsive: it is repulsive only relatively to 
other positive charges. Then the multiples arrows that enter in the representation of the field are not intrinsic to 
it. They depend on the pole of the test charge that we choose. This may be a problem for those dispositionalists 
who claim that fields are intrinsic powers. 
36 Armstrong (1997) finally seems to maintain it only because it is a lesser evil, dispositionalism being avoided. 
37 Molnar (2003: 164): “The fundamental powers in nature are powers to exert a force”, see also pp. 134, 195 ; 
Ellis (2001: 128): “A causal power is a disposition of something to produce forces of a certain kind. 
Gravitational mass for example, is a causal power”. For difficulties in the interpretation of Cartwright’s view, see 
M. Schrenk (2007). 
38 Wilson (2002à; Schrenk (2007). 
39 Armstrong (1997: 79). 
40 See Molnar (2003: 64). 
41 For different arguments against the view that forces are dispositions see Bigelow, Ellis, and Pargetter, 
(1988: 106).  
42 For a close position concerning the direction of forces see Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988: 629). 
Nevertheless, these authors deny that forces are dispositions. They claim that they are asymmetrical relations. 
43 Note that nothing I’ve said here rules out the following possibility: forces may still be dispositional relations. 
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44 The view that forces are symmetrical relation seems to be assumed by writers, such as Kant, Boscovitch, 
Helmholtz or Broad. 
45 This is especially the case with gravitation. Consideration the law F = (km1m2)/r2, physicists speak as if there is 
only one relation between m1 and m2. 
46 either between the two bodies  the relate, or nowhere, as Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter claim —universals 
having no location according to them. 
47 The fact that attractive and repulsive forces have the same point of application, that is, the facts that they exert 
on the same body is what distinguishes them from action-reaction pairs. 
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